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JUSTIFIED BUT NEGLIGENT RELIANCE:
HICKS V. ELLER ALLOWS COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE TO NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS
Abigail Marrs Yates*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Hicks v. Eller,1 the New Mexico Court of Appeals for the first
time addressed whether comparative negligence2 is a valid defense to a
claim for negligent misrepresentation.3 Noting a jurisdictional split on the
issue,4 Hicks adopted the majority rule that the doctrine of comparative
fault5 applies to negligent misrepresentation.6 In so holding, the court of
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1. Hicks v. Eller, 2012-NMCA-061, 280 P.3d 304, cert. denied, No. 33,519 (May 8,
2012).
2. In Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234, superseded by
statute, NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987), the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the
doctrine of comparative negligence. Scott abolished contributory negligence, which
totally barred a negligent plaintiff from recovering against the defendant. Comparative negligence instead apportions fault between a negligent plaintiff and defendant
when each contributes a percentage to the plaintiff’s injury. See also Baxter v. Noce,
1988-NMSC-024, ¶ 12, 107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240 (“In adopting the doctrine of comparative negligence, we supplanted the all-or-nothing bar of contributory negligence
. . . it still exists to diminish or deny the claimant’s recovery in proportion to his
relative fault, and it is thus governed by the comparative negligence rule.”). New
Mexico is a “pure” comparative fault jurisdiction, which means that “the plaintiff’s
percentage of contributing fault will reduce his recovery of total damages suffered in
an amount equal to his degree of fault, at the same time exposing him to liability to
and recovery by defendant for injuries incurred by defendant as a result of plaintiff’s
proportionate negligence.” Scott, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 27.
3. “Principles of negligence govern the law of negligent misrepresentation, also
referred to as ‘negligence by words.’ ” Saylor v. Valles, 2003-NMCA-037, ¶ 17, 133
N.M. 432, 63 P.3d 1152.
4. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 30.
5. This case note will use the terms “comparative fault” and “comparative negligence” interchangeably as both refer to the same principle of apportioning fault be-
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appeals affirmed New Mexico’s adherence to the Second Restatement7 to
define negligent misrepresentation, and agreed with the majority of states
that refuse to distinguish the tort from negligence causing physical harm
when allowing comparative fault.8
While Hicks adopted the majority rule, the court provided no guidelines for applying comparative negligence to the tort of negligent misrepresentation in New Mexico. First, the court’s reasoning raises more
questions than it answers: Is the plaintiff still required to show “justified
reliance” in order to state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss?9 Or is justified reliance simply another way of saying the plaintiff
was not negligent? Second, Hicks inadequately distinguished New Mexico precedent contrary to the court’s holding. Third, the court did not
consider the majority rule’s policy effects on consumer protection and fair
bargaining. These flaws diminish Hicks’s value as a guide for applying
comparative fault principles to the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
Part II reviews the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ rationale in
Hicks and Judge Kennedy’s dissent advocating for the minority rule. Part
III examines the background and development of the tort of negligent
misrepresentation in New Mexico, focusing on New Mexico’s reliance on
the Second Restatement to define the claim. Part IV of this case note
explains the majority and minority rules in general and how various
courts across the country have applied them. Finally, Part V of this note
examines the critical shortcomings of the court of appeals’ opinion in
Hicks and concludes that the court should have provided a more thorough analytical framework to evaluate a comparative fault defense to
negligent misrepresentation.
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tween the plaintiff and the defendant according to the percentage of negligence of
each party. See Scott, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 27.
6. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 34.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
8. Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Doctrine
to Actions Based on Negligent Misrepresentation, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 464 (1994); but see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 1 (2000), which explains, “Causes of action other than those for death, personal injury, or physical damage to tangible property are not part of the core to which comparative responsibility is
directed.”
9. See Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Estate of
Braswell v. People’s Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 515 (R.I. 1992) (discussing and
adopting minority rule).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts and Background
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10. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 3.
11. Id. ¶ 6.
12. Id. ¶ 3.
13. Id.
14. Appellant’s Brief-in-Chief at 1, Hicks v. Eller, 2012-NMCA-061 (No. 30,026).
15. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 5.
16. William Herbert “Buck” Dunton (1878–1936) was born in Augusta, Maine.
He journeyed to Montana in 1896, and for many years traveled throughout the Southwest, including New Mexico. He visited Taos, New Mexico for the first time in 1912
and permanently moved there in 1914 after falling in love with the “varieties of atmosphere” he found there. Dunton co-founded the Taos Society of Artists in 1915. He
died in Taos at the age of 57. W. HERBERT DUNTON Biographical Information, http://
www.dunton.org/whd_exhibit/whd_biography.htm (last visited May 14, 2014).
17. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 8.
18. Id.
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Mary Jane Hicks was appointed personal representative of her late
mother’s estate in 2007.10 The estate contained many pieces of artwork,
including two paintings that Hicks located in the basement of her late
mother’s home.11 Hicks knew nothing of the two paintings’ origin or
worth, so she contacted Peter Eller, a professional art appraiser and gallery owner, to help value them.12 Hicks selected Eller to assist her because she had previously heard advertisements on a local radio station
touting his expert appraisal services.13
Hicks and Eller met in person, and Eller explained the terms and
costs associated with providing his appraisal services.14 He contended that
during the course of this meeting, it became apparent that Hicks was less
interested in his professional appraisal services and was more interested
in selling some of the items in her mother’s estate.15 Eller then offered to
take a look at the artwork, and asked if he could make an offer to
purchase any of the works of interest to him. Hicks agreed to Eller’s proposed arrangement.
Hicks eventually showed Eller the two paintings she had found in
storage, one of which was signed “Dunton.” He took interest in these
works, explaining to Hicks that the artist, William Herbert Dunton,16 was
a member of the Taos Society of Artists active in the 1920s and 1930s.
The paintings were slightly damaged, but Eller nonetheless informed
Hicks that he wished to purchase the paintings for $4,500. She asked Eller
if this was a fair price, but Eller did not respond to the question. Instead,
he simply asked her if the two “had a deal.”17 Hicks accepted, and Eller
paid her $4,500 for both of the Dunton paintings.18
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Several months later, Eller sold the Dunton paintings to a Santa Fe,
New Mexico dealer for $35,000.19 That dealer then sold the two Duntons
to yet another dealer for $300,000.20 Finally, in July of 2008 that dealer
sold the paintings at the Couer d’Alene auction in Las Vegas, Nevada for
a staggering $600,000.21
B. Procedural Posture from the Second Judicial District Court
Hicks found out about the auction sale and sued Eller for “fraud,
dispossession and conversion, negligent misrepresentation, violation of
the [Unfair Practices Act], and professional negligence.”22 In her complaint, Hicks requested $495,000 in actual damages, $500,000 in punitive
damages, and $1,486,500 in treble damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
costs.23
On August 17, 2009, the matter proceeded to trial in the Second
Judicial District Court in Bernalillo County, New Mexico.24 The trial
judge instructed the jury only on the misrepresentation claims.25 Regarding those claims, and over Hicks’s objection, Eller proposed a comparative negligence instruction to reduce Hicks’s damages. Despite that Eller
had not asserted the defense in his answer or in his pre-trial papers, the
trial judge permitted a comparative negligence instruction, asserting that
“any time you have negligence” the jury can enter into a comparative
fault analysis.26 Eller’s comparative fault defense was based on evidence

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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19. Id. ¶ 12.
20. Appellant’s Brief-In-Chief at 12.
21. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 9; see also Appellant’s Brief-In-Chief at 13 (explaining that the ultimate seller sold the works for $600,000 less 5 percent, receiving
$575,000 for them). See also Scott Sandlin, Jury Awards $15K in Art Sale Dispute,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 26, 2009, available at http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/
26225982719newsmetro08-26-09.htm.
22. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 9.
23. Id.
24. Appellant’s Brief-In-Chief at 2.
25. Id. at 10. The judge did not instruct the jury on the Unfair Practices Act claim,
finding that Hicks failed to establish an essential component of the claim—that she
had acquired services from Eller. Id. Hicks also filed a motion for additur, which the
court denied. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 38. The motion for additur was based on
expert testimony that the Dunton paintings were worth at least $405,000. Id. “Additur” is a trial court order “with the defendant’s consent, that increases the jury’s
award of damages to avoid a new trial on grounds of inadequate damages. The term
may also refer to the increase itself, the procedure, or the court’s power to make the
order.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
26. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 24.
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relating to Hicks’ professional background as an electrical engineer.27 At
trial, Eller’s attorney extensively cross-examined Hicks on her “experience in the use of computers” in order to portray her as equally intelligent and sophisticated as Eller, and therefore comparatively negligent in
failing to learn the true value of the Dunton paintings.28 Based on the
comparative fault instruction, the jury found Hicks 27 percent at fault and
Eller 73 percent at fault.29 The jury awarded Hicks $20,000 and reduced it
accordingly to a final judgment against Eller of $14,600.30
C. Rationale from the New Mexico Court of Appeals
On appeal, Hicks contended the district court erred in permitting
Eller to raise a comparative fault defense to her negligent misrepresentation claim.31 Hicks claimed that comparative negligence, as a matter of
law, does not apply to negligent misrepresentation.32 The appeals court
noted it was dealing with a matter of first impression: whether the affirmative defense of comparative fault applies to a negligent misrepresentation cause of action.33

27. Appellant’s Brief-In-Chief at 11. Hicks objected to evidence introduced at
trial regarding her background as a PhD in electrical engineering. See Appellee’s Answer Brief at 7, Hicks v. Eller, 2012-NMCA-061 (No. 30,026). Eller contented that
Hicks was comparably negligent because she was well educated in the sciences and
experienced with computers, apparently based on the notion that she should have
taken it upon herself to research the Dunton paintings before relying on Eller’s professional representations. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 7–8.
28. Appellant’s Brief-in-Chief at 19.
29. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 11. The jury instruction read:

C M
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Id. ¶ 23 (alteration in original).
30. Id. ¶ 12.
31. Id. ¶ 28. Hicks further argued the trial court should have granted her motion
for additur in light of the expert’s testimony, and claimed that her UPA claim should
have gone to the jury. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on
these issues as well. Id. ¶ 2.
32. Id. ¶ 30. Another of Hicks’ contentions on appeal was that because Eller
failed to raise comparative fault before trial in his answer or the pre-trial order, he
was precluded from claiming the defense at the end of trial. Id. ¶ 25. While the court
of appeals ultimately disagreed with Hicks on that narrow point, an examination of
the question is beyond the scope of this article. See id. ¶¶ 25–28.
33. Id. ¶ 30.
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If you find [Hicks’] injury was caused by a combination of negligence of
[Eller] and negligence of [Hicks], you must determine the amount of damages
to be awarded as follows:
First: In accordance with the damage instruction I have given you, determine the total amount of damages suffered by [Hicks].
Second: Compare the negligence of [Hicks] and [Eller] and determine a
percentage for each so that the total of the percentage equals 100%.

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 74 Side B

06/25/2014 11:26:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-2\NMX207.txt

440

unknown

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Seq: 6

25-JUN-14

9:41

[Vol. 44

The court of appeals began its analysis by observing that comparative negligence principles apply unless inconsistent with New Mexico
public policy concerns.34 The court first noted that Hicks had not raised
any public policy arguments in favor of her position that comparative
fault does not apply to negligent misrepresentation.35 The court then
moved to distinguishing prior New Mexico appellate decisions that, while
dealing with “closely related matters,” were inapposite to the specific
case at hand, which concerned only negligent misrepresentation and comparative fault as an affirmative defense.36 The court discussed Otero v.
Jordan Restaurant Enterprises,37 where the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that comparative negligence is never a defense to fraudulent misrepresentation.38 The majority in Hicks noted the difference between fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation: fraudulent
misrepresentation involves intentionally or recklessly misleading statements,39 whereas negligent misrepresentation does not require knowledge
or intent.40 Otero relied primarily on public policy in prohibiting a comparative fault defense to fraudulent misrepresentation because a defendant “guilty of fraud cannot be allowed by operation of law to profit by
that fraud.”41
After distinguishing Otero because it dealt with fraudulent misrepresentation, the court of appeals turned to Neff v. Bud Lewis Co.,42 a New
Mexico Court of Appeals decision that dealt with a defendant’s attempt
to raise contributory negligence as a complete defense to the plaintiff’s
negligent misrepresentation claim.43 Neff involved a negligent misrepresentation claim against a defendant who had a fiduciary relationship with
the plaintiff.44 Neff held that the defendant could not use contributory

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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34. Id. ¶ 29 (citing Reichert v. Atler, 1994-NMSC-056, 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d
379).
35. Id.
36. Id. ¶ 30.
37. 1996-NMSC-047, 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569.
38. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 30.
39. Id.; see also UJI 13-1633 NMRA.
40. Id.; see also UJI 13-1632 NMRA (“A negligent misrepresentation is one
where the speaker has no reasonable ground for believing that the statement made
was true.”); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 107, at 704 (4th ed. 1971)
(“When the representation is made directly to the plaintiff, in the course of his dealings with the defendant, or is exhibited to him by the defendant with knowledge that
he intends to rely upon it . . . there has been no difficulty in finding a duty of reasonable care.”).
41. Otero, 1996-NMSC-047, ¶ 17.
42. 1976-NMCA-029, 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107.
43. Neff, 1975-NMCA-029, ¶ 17.
44. Id. ¶ 4.
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45. Id. ¶ 22.
46. Hicks v. Eller, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 30.
47. Id. ¶ 31.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Estate of Braswell v. People’s Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 513 (R.I.
1992)).
50. Id. ¶ 33.
51. Id. ¶ 32 (citing Braswell, 602 A.2d at 514 and Carroll v. Gava, 98 Cal. App. 3d
892, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)).
52. Id. ¶ 33.
53. See Reichert v. Atler, 1994-NMSC-056, ¶ 8, 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379.
54. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 33.
55. Id. ¶ 34.

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 75 Side A

negligence as a total bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.45 In distinguishing
Neff, Hicks emphasized that the defendant in Neff was a fiduciary and
that the case was decided under the rubric of contributory negligence.46
After distinguishing Otero and Neff, the Hicks court turned to other
jurisdictions’ decisions on whether comparative fault applies to negligent
misrepresentation, noting a jurisdictional split.47 First, Hicks explained
the majority rule, which applies comparative fault to negligent misrepresentation because it is not meaningfully distinguishable from negligence
in general.48 Majority rule jurisdictions hold that comparative fault is a
convenient way to apportion liability when the misrepresentation is “only
negligent.”49 These courts determine that the majority rule is consistent
with the principles outlined in the Restatement, principles that “have
been widely accepted” in New Mexico.50
The majority in Hicks then considered the minority rule, which
holds that principles of comparative fault have “no place” in business
transactions and that any risk of making false statements should be fully
borne by the party making them.51 The Hicks majority rejected the minority rule.52 It found no reason why applying comparative fault to negligent
misrepresentation would be contrary to public policy in New Mexico.53
Instead, the appeals court explained that comparative fault would be a
“simple” way to apportion fault between a negligent defendant and a
negligent plaintiff, even in the context of everyday business exchanges
where individuals rely upon information provided by experts and
professionals.54
The majority concluded by stating that, because principles governing negligence set forth in the Restatement apply to all torts in New
Mexico, those principles support applying comparative fault to negligent
misrepresentation. It held that the trial court had not erred in permitting
Eller’s comparative fault jury instruction.55
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Judge Kennedy dissented, vigorously advocating for the minority
rule.56 He explained that because justified reliance is an element of negligent misrepresentation claims, comparative negligence should not enter
into the analysis.57 He reasoned:
I was persuaded by these cases that the analysis of negligent misrepresentation requires two components, only one of which—the
negligence of the representation—involves negligence. The other
element of justified reliance on the misrepresentation by the misrepresentation’s recipient is an element requiring an assessment
not of negligence in reliance, but justification. The ‘minority view’
holds that to compare negligence in reliance negates the requirement of ‘justified’ reliance entirely, a point with which I agree.
Justification is therefore not to be graded on a sliding scale or ‘the
curve.’ A recipient of a misrepresentation, to my mind, is either
‘justified’ in her reliance or is not.58

Judge Kennedy pointed out that Hicks was completely justified in
her reliance on Eller’s skill and expertise regarding accurately appraising
works of art. Judge Kennedy concluded that he would have regarded the
jury’s comparative fault instruction as error, and would have awarded
Hicks all that she was entitled to without reduction based on her own
negligence.59
III. BACKGROUND ON NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
LAW IN NEW MEXICO

C M
Y K

06/25/2014 11:26:56

56. Id. ¶ 42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Judge Kennedy noted the “moral repugnancy” of the defendant’s behavior, noting that had it not been for Eller presenting
himself as an expert art appraiser, he would not have gained access to Hicks’ late
mother’s home in the first place. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 18 N.E. 168, 169–70 (Mass. 1888)
(defendant falsely represented information in a land survey but honestly believed it to
be true, and the court held the defendant could still be liable for the misrepresentation despite no intent to deceive); Int’l Products Co. v. Erie R. Co., 155 N.E. 662, 663
(N.Y. 1927) (discussing “liability for negligent language” stating, “[i]n some cases a
negligent statement may be the basis for a recovery of damages”). See also Michael D.
Lieder, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: Building

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 75 Side B

New Mexico recognized negligent misrepresentation later than most
other jurisdictions. By the late 1800s, many states recognized that individuals should be liable for failing to exercise a reasonable degree of care in
information exchanges, even without intent to deceive.60 These early
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cases noted a departure from the narrow English rule that there was no
valid claim at law to recover damages for negligent words, even when
individuals acted on those words to their financial detriment.61 The tort
deals with negligent information causing economic harm to the plaintiff.62
In adopting the cause of action in New Mexico, courts accepted the definition of negligent misrepresentation63 set forth in the Second
Restatement:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.64

While New Mexico follows the Restatement to define the elements
a plaintiff must prove to establish a defendant’s liability, courts also look

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937, 948 (1991) (explaining that the cause
of action arose from a number of New York decisions in the early 1900s); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 552 (1938) (liability when defendant does not “exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the information
which its recipient is justified in expecting”).
61. See, e.g., Int’l Products Co., 155 N.E. at 663 (discussing iterations of the early
English rule prohibiting recovery for negligent words).
62. However, some New Mexico opinions have dealt with negligent misrepresentation involving physical, as opposed to strictly economic harm. Davis v. Board of
County Comm’rs of Doña Ana County, 1999-NMCA-110, ¶¶ 18–19, 127 N.M. 785,
987 P.2d 1172 (discussing negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical
harm).
63. “The law of negligent misrepresentation is governed by negligence principles.” Ruiz v. Garcia, 1993-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 115 N.M. 269, 850 P.2d 972 (citing Peck,
Inc. v. Liberty Fed. Sav. Bank, 1988-NMCA-111, ¶ 10, 108 N.M. 84, 766 P.2d 928).
“The issue in a negligence action is always one of reasonableness. The reasonableness
or unreasonableness of anything is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact which
should be determined by a jury.” W. States Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Sandia Corp.,
1990-NMCA-094, ¶ 14, 110 N.M. 676, 798 P.2d 1062.
64. Stotlar v. Hester, 1978-NMCA-067, ¶ 12, 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977)). Essentially, the speaker has absolutely no reasonable basis for believing the statement that he made was true. See
Sandia Corp., 1990-NMCA-094, ¶¶ 12–14. The elements of negligent misrepresentation should not be confused with those required to establish fraudulent misrepresentation: “[F]raudulent misrepresentation requires the defendant to make the statement
recklessly or with knowledge that it is false, while negligent misrepresentation only
requires a failure to exercise ordinary care in obtaining or communicating the statement . . . .” Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc., 1998-NMCA-017, ¶ 55,
124 N.M. 549, 953 P.2d 722.
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to New Mexico’s Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI) on negligent
misrepresentation:
A party is liable for damages caused by his negligent and material
misrepresentation.
A material misrepresentation is an untrue statement which a party
intends the other party to rely on and upon which the other party
did in fact rely.
A negligent misrepresentation is one where the speaker has no
reasonable ground for believing that the statement made was
true.65

A. Early Case Law: Plaintiff Must Prove Fraud or Rescind a Contract,
Otherwise No Recovery
Following early English case law, New Mexico courts initially required a plaintiff to pursue an equitable cause of action to rescind a contract, or to satisfy the high burden of proving fraud, in order to establish
liability for false representations resulting in pecuniary harm.66 Before
recognizing negligent misrepresentation as a viable claim, early New
Mexico cases recognized a similar cause of action, sometimes called constructive fraud67 (with rescission68 as the equitable remedy),69 when a
plaintiff could not establish the defendant’s fraudulent state of mind. The
supreme court once defined constructive fraud as
[A] breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the
moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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65. UJI 13-1632 NMRA.
66. See Maxey v. Quintana, 1972-NMCA-069, ¶ 15, 84 N.M. 38, 499 P.2d 356 (citing Peek v. Derry, [1887] 37 Ch. 541, 14 App. Cas. 337 (Eng.)).
67. Constructive fraud is “a breach of a legal or equitable duty irrespective of the
moral guilt of the fraud feasor, and it is not necessary that actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive exist.” Snell v. Cornehl, 1970-NMSC-029, ¶ 8, 81 N.M. 248,
466 P.2d 94.
68. Rescission, an equitable remedy, is “[a] party’s unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason, such as the other partys material breach, or a
judgment rescinding the contract.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
69. Snell, 1970-NMSC-029, ¶ 11. Courts used the term “rescission” to describe the
cause of action itself, or to describe the equitable remedy available under constructive
fraud. Either way, a contract had to exist to rescind upon. As Snell stated, the common view was that a plaintiff’s only recovery apart from proving fraud and suing for
money damages was to “declare a rescission and sue to recover consideration already
paid” or “sue to rescind the contract and for restoration of the status quo ante . . . ”
Id.
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confidence, or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty
of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud.70
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70. Scudder v. Hart, 1941-NMSC-004, ¶ 16, 45 N.M. 76, 110 P.2d 536 (emphasis
removed) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Maxey, 1972-NMCA-069, ¶ 9.
72. Snell, 1970-NMSC-029, ¶ 11 (explaining that a plaintiff could either receive
back any consideration already paid, or to restore the “status quo ante”).
73. Jones v. Friedman, 1953-NMSC-051, ¶ 22, 57 N.M. 361, 258 P.2d 1131.
74. Maxey, 1972-NMCA-069, ¶ 9 (citing Sauter v. St. Michael’s College, 1962NMSC-107, ¶ 9, 70 N.M. 380, 374 P.2d 134).
75. 1967-NMSC-132, 78 N.M. 101, 428 P.2d 640.
76. Id. ¶ 8.
77. 1971-NMSC-059, 82 N.M. 597, 485 P.2d 353.
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Rescission was an independent cause of action from fraud or deceit
because in the former the defendant’s state of mind did not matter.71 But
rescission was not an action for money damages, so it required a contract
that the parties could rescind. 72 Foreshadowing negligent misrepresentation, rescission was articulated in terms of justifiable reliance by the
plaintiff. The rule was that “irrespective of the good faith with which a
misrepresentation of material fact is made, if it is justifiably relied on by
one seeking rescission of the contract, such rescission should be allowed.”73 On the other hand, unlike the equitable cause of action for rescission, “[t]o recover damages for fraud or deceit, the misrepresentation
must be knowingly or recklessly made with intent to deceive.”74
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Anaya,75 five years before
a New Mexico court recognized negligent misrepresentation as a valid
claim, the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the principles governing
rescission. Our supreme court stated that “rescission is allowed where
there has been a misrepresentation of a material fact, the misrepresentation was made to be relied on, and has in fact been relied on. Again generally speaking, the good faith with which the misrepresentation is made
is immaterial.”76 Anaya thus established that for a plaintiff to proceed in
rescission, there had to be a contract. Despite the defendant’s good faith,
the plaintiff could rescind the contract based on the defendant’s misrepresentation, but could not recover money damages.
Four years after Anaya, in Hockett v. Winks,77 the New Mexico Supreme Court further articulated the distinction between rescission of a
contract, an exclusively equitable remedy, and the necessary proof to obtain money damages at law for misrepresentations. Importantly, Hockett
noted that plaintiffs could not conflate the two separate causes of action
by relying on rescission principles of good faith misrepresentations in or-
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der to recover damages.78 Hockett held that the equitable principles applicable to a rescission claim were not applicable to a claim for fraud or
deceit; there could be no “new tort” which combined these separate
causes of action.79
This early case law established that if the plaintiff could not prove
fraud or could not rescind on a contract, she or he would be without a
remedy for a defendant’s negligent misrepresentations.80
B. Maxey v. Quintana: the New Mexico Supreme Court Recognizes
Negligent Misrepresentation

C M
Y K
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78. Id. ¶ 6.
79. Id.
80. See Maxey, 1972-NMCA-069, ¶ 16 (explaining the old view that because negligent misrepresentation did not fall under fraud or deceit, “no other action was available and that the wrong of negligent misrepresentation was without a remedy”).
81. Id. ¶ 14.
82. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
83. Id. ¶ 2. The plaintiff also asserted fraudulent misrepresentation. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 8.
85. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
86. Id. ¶ 14.
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In 1972, only one year after the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Hockett disavowed the notion that a plaintiff could recover money damages for misrepresentations not involving fraudulent intent, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in Maxey v. Quintana recognized that negligent
misrepresentation was a valid cause of action wholly apart from rescission
or fraud.81
In Maxey, the defendants sold real property to the plaintiff but misrepresented essential information regarding the property’s mortgage.82
The plaintiff incurred substantial mortgage costs in light of the defendants’ misrepresentations.83 The plaintiff appealed the lower court’s dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim, and the defendants
contended that negligent misrepresentation was not a viable cause of action in New Mexico.84 Specifically, they argued that a plaintiff could either recover for fraudulent misrepresentation, or under the equitable
claim of rescission, or not at all.85 The court of appeals rejected the defendants’ assertion and noted that it was dealing with situation apart from
fraud and apart from rescission; specifically, “the claim that misrepresentations occurred and that the misrepresentations were negligently made
to plaintiffs’ damage.”86 Maxey did what earlier cases had been unwilling
to do—it recognized that certain situations involve “neither rescission nor
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the tort of fraud,” but still should give rise to a plaintiff’s right to
damages.87
First, the court of appeals acknowledged the early doctrine requiring
a plaintiff to prove fraud or rescission, without which the plaintiff would
have no remedy at law.88 The court then confronted the question directly:
“Where a plaintiff is so circumstanced that he cannot or does not wish to
rescind, and cannot meet the proof required for the tort of fraud or deceit, is he without a remedy for damages cause by a misrepresentation
short of fraud?”89 This question set up the framework for Maxey to recognize the new tort of negligent misrepresentation.90 In holding that a negligence action could be based upon loss causing only pecuniary harm,91 the
court reasoned that the essential basis of tort liability could be transferred
to injuries causing only economic loss.92 It further explained that the tort
of negligent misrepresentation was informed by general negligence principles and that it was wholly separate from fraud.93 Lastly, the court in
Maxey noted that its adoption of negligent misrepresentation was not
only compatible with the Restatement, but also recent New Mexico precedent.94 Maxey concluded that despite no contractual relationship between two parties and no fraud by the defendant, a plaintiff could go
forward with a claim for money damages under the tort of negligent
misrepresentation.95

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 9.
89. Id. ¶ 15.
90. Id. ¶ 17.
91. Id. Maxey explained that neither fraud nor rescission were at issue, just that
“misrepresentations occurred and that the misrepresentations were negligently made
to plaintiffs’ damage.” The court thus distinguished claims for fraud or “constructive
fraud/rescission” in laying the foundation to allow the plaintiff to recover for negligent misrepresentation. Id. ¶ 14.
92. Id. ¶ 16 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 720 (3d ed.
1964) (“This position has prevailed, and the negligence action is now generally allowed for negligent misrepresentation, even though it causes only pecuniary harm
. . . .”)).
93. Maxey, 1972-NMCA-069, ¶ 17.
94. Id. (explaining that “it was not necessary that actual dishonesty of purpose or
intent to deceive exist,” only that there was “breach of a legal duty” (citing Snell v.
Cornehl, 1970-NMSC-029, ¶ 8)).
95. Id. ¶ 17.
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C. Clarifying the Tort: Stotlar v. Hester Rejects the Privity Requirement
and Adopts the Restatement Approach
In 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts was published. The following year the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Stotlar v. Hester96 concluded that the Restatement would define negligent misrepresentation in
New Mexico.97 The plaintiff in Stotlar asserted that he was entitled to recover damages despite the fact that there was no privity98 of contract between the parties.99 Because there was no privity, the defendant
contended that he was not liable to plaintiffs.100 He argued that to succeed
the plaintiff would either have to prove fraud or would have to show
privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. Stotlar rejected this argument, noting that privity of contract was no longer required when considering liability for negligence.101
The defendant’s assertion that negligence causing financial harm
was not actionable arose from a line of early New Mexico cases requiring
privity between parties to establish liability for negligent words.102 The
leading case articulating this principle was Ultramares Corp. v. Touche. 103
There, Justice Cardozo explained that the potential class of plaintiffs
would be unreasonably large if a plaintiff unconstrained by privity of contract could recover for negligent statements made by anyone else; therefore, a contractual relationship was required for a plaintiff to sue for
misrepresentations causing economic injury.104
In 1943, in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Atherton, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the Ultramares rule requiring the plaintiff to show
privity with the defendant to recover for negligent words.105 Three years

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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96. 1978-NMCA-067, 92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403.
97. Id. ¶ 13.
98. “A person in privity with another is a person so identified in interest with
another that he represents the same legal right.” Lewis v. City of Santa Fe, 2005NMCA-032, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 152, 108 P.3d 558 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
99. Stotlar, 1978-NMCA-067, ¶ 5. A third party, the seller of the real estate at
issue, had arranged for the defendant to appraise their property, which is why there
was not privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 6.
101. Id. ¶ 11.
102. Id. ¶ 9.
103. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
104. Id. at 444. The court later explained: “the ensuing liability for negligence is
one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by
whom the contract has been made.” Id. at 448.
105. 1943-NMSC-046, 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157. This case did not mention a tort
of negligent misrepresentation but instead dealt with the equitable remedy of “subrogration.” Id. ¶ 9. It is notable for the proposition that absent fraud, courts required
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later, in Valdez v. Gonzales,106 the court returned to the privity issue in
the context of a plaintiff’s claim that negligent information caused him
economic harm.107 The court reiterated its commitment to the Ultramares
holding.108
Atherton and Valdez supported the defendant’s claim in Stotlar that
based on the lack of privity, the plaintiff could not recover for negligent
words causing pecuniary harm.109 However the Stotlar court distinguished
Atherton and Valdez as having been implicitly rejected by the supreme
court when it held that the existence of privity had no relevance in determining liability for negligence.110 The court further noted, “[a]bsent fraud,
the tort requires a duty on the part of the person furnishing the information and requires the person receiving the information have a right to rely
on it.”111 The court reiterated the principles it had recently articulated in
Maxey and held that the Second Restatement of Torts would define negligent misrepresentation in New Mexico.112

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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“contractual duty to make [reports], under the terms of their contract, with the care
and caution required of experts.” Id. ¶ 10.
106. 1946-NMSC-044, 50 N.M. 281, 176 P.2d 173.
107. Id. ¶ 16.
108. Id. ¶ 14 (citing Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 441) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. Stotlar, 1978-NMCA-067, ¶ 7.
110. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Const. Co., 1968-NMSC-055, 79
N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798).
111. Id.
112. Id. ¶ 13. After Stotlar officially adopted the Restatement to define negligent
misrepresentation, New Mexico appellate courts continued to recognize claims for
negligence by words causing pecuniary harm. See First Interstate Bank of Gallup v.
Foutz, 1988-NMSC-087, ¶ 8, 107 N.M. 749, 764 P.2d 1307 (affirming New Mexico’s
adoption of the Restatement and focusing on measuring damages pursuant to the
Restatement). But despite the clarity with which Stotlar adopted the Restatement,
some of the courts unfortunately defined negligent misrepresentation in a manner
that departed from the Restatement entirely by conflating the elements required to
prove fraudulent misrepresentation with those required to establish negligent misrepresentation. See Saylor v. Valles, 2003-NMCA-037, ¶ 17, 133 N.M. 432, 63 P.3d 1152
(explaining that the court of appeals had framed the issue as one of recklessness instead of reasonableness; the New Mexico Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant must have made the false representation knowing it was false, or must have
“made it recklessly” id. ¶ 17 (citing Parker v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc.,
1995-NMCA-086, ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 120, 909 P.2d 1)). The court of appeals issued a
similar decision in Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, 2005NMCA-097, ¶ 30, 138 N.M. 70, 16 P.3d 861, where it required a defendant to know its
statement was false, or to make it recklessly.
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D. The Second Restatement of Torts’ Definition of Negligent
Misrepresentation
The Restatement does not require that the person making the misrepresentation know the individual with whom he or she is communicating.113 The defendant only needs to be reasonably aware that the
individual will use that information for guidance in his or her own business transactions.114 As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained,
liability is not limited to business exchanges in which the information itself is the subject of the exchange; rather, it includes representations
made as part of ones’ employment or expertise.115
The Restatement outlines the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation and adds, “[t]he recipient
of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary
loss suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent in so relying.”116 It further explains:
[W]hen the misrepresentation is not fraudulent but only negligent,
the action is founded solely upon negligence, and the ordinary
rules as to negligence liability apply. Therefore the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff in relying upon the misrepresentation
will bar his recovery.117

While the Restatement does not require that the parties to an exchange know one another, it does not permit simply anyone to recover
damages for the negligent words of anyone else.118 The Restatement
states:

C M
Y K
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113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
115. Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 657 A.2d 212, 221 (Conn. 1995).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 552A (1977).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 552A cmt. a (1977).
118. See Robert K. Wise & Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas:
The Misunderstood Tort, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 845, 852 (2008).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 552(2) (1977).
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[L]iability for negligent misrepresentation is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance defendant intends to supply information or knows that recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through
reliance upon information in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends, or in
a substantially similar transaction.119
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Comment A to the Restatement explains that negligent misrepresentation is less objectionable than fraudulent misrepresentation, which is
why liability is more restricted under the former.120 Thus “[w]hen there is
no intent to deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault
of the maker of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for its consequences.”121
E. New Mexico’s Uniform Jury Instruction on Negligent
Misrepresentation and the Restatement

C M
Y K
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120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 552(2) cmt. a (1977).
121. Id.
122. UJI 13-1632 NMRA.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. UJI 13-1632 NMRA, cmt.
126. Id. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico has referenced both the UJI and the Restatement, and harmonized the two definitions on a
number of opinions. See, e.g., Sawyer v. USAA Ins. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1147
(D.N.M. 2012); Carroll v. Los Alamos Nat. Sec., LLC, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1213
(D.N.M. 2010) (treating the UJI and Restatement as containing the same
requirements).
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At first glance New Mexico’s Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI)122
seems to vary from the Restatement definition of negligent misrepresentation. Unlike the Restatement, the UJI does not explicitly require a
plaintiff to show “justified reliance.” The UJI refers the reader to the
Restatement for further guidance, and arguably this reference implicitly
incorporates the Restatement’s “justified reliance” element.123 There are
no New Mexico appellate court decisions to the contrary.
The UJI first states, “[a] negligent misrepresentation is one where
the speaker has no reasonable ground for believing that the statement
made was true.”124 This framework does not clearly require the plaintiff’s
reliance to be “justified,” but the committee commentary recognizes that
New Mexico has adopted negligent misrepresentation as defined by the
Restatement. It specifically directs the reader to the Restatement, and
notes that there are “a number of elements that must be proved to establish the claim.”125 The commentary further explains that to “avoid overburdening the jury, other elements are not included in the instruction
unless they are actually at issue in the case.”126 Because New Mexico
courts since Stotlar have continued to endorse the Restatement and the
UJI’s commentary points to the Restatement for a fuller definition of the
tort, it is safe to assume that the UJI like the Restatement requires justified reliance in order to succeed in a negligent misrepresentation claim.
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F. Neff v. Bud Lewis: The Rejection of Contributory Negligence as a
Defense to Negligent Misrepresentation
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Y K
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127. 1976-NMCA-029, 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107.
128. See Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 27.
129. Neff, 1976-NMCA-029, ¶ 4.
130. Id. ¶ 5.
131. Id. ¶ 14. The court explained that the defendants were fiduciaries and as brokers were “under a legal obligation to make a full, fair and prompt disclosure to his
employer of all facts within his knowledge which are or may be material, or which
might affect his principal’s rights and interest or influence his action relative to the
disposition of the property.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Iriart v.
Johnson, 1965-NMSC-147, 75 N.M. 745, 411 P.2d 226).
132. Id. ¶ 16.
133. Id. ¶ 21.
134. Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis removed).
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Neff v. Bud Lewis Co. was the first case in New Mexico to address
whether contributory negligence is a valid defense to negligent misrepresentation.127 Neff was decided in 1976, five years before New Mexico abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative
fault.128 In Neff, the plaintiff sued a real estate broker as well as the individual who sold him a building for misrepresenting facts related to the
building’s condition.129 The defendants represented that the building’s
heating and cooling system was in good working order prior to the sale,
but the plaintiff later learned of substantial problems with the system,
which required over $30,000 in repairs.130
The court of appeals first explained that because the defendants
were real estate brokers, they owed the plaintiff a specific duty to disclose
all material facts known about the condition of the building prior to selling it.131 The court next reasoned that the plaintiff reasonably relied on
the defendants’ material misrepresentations.132 Tracking the Restatement’s language, the court in Neff affirmed the trial court’s finding that
the plaintiff had justifiably relied on the defendants’ misrepresentations.133 The court distinguished the plaintiff’s reliance in terms of justification, not negligence: “The issue is not that plaintiff had a duty to
exercise reasonable care in making a determination whether to rely on
defendants’ negligent representation.”134 The court emphasized that when
a plaintiff’s reliance on the expertise of the defendant is justified, the defendant cannot later succeed in claiming the plaintiff’s reliance was
negligent.
The defendants in Neff argued that if they were negligent, “the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence” and that this contributory
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negligence “was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damage.”135 The court of
appeals rejected this argument:
The Restatement language means that a defendant who supplies
information is subject to liability in tort for negligent misrepresentation if he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining
and communicating information which the plaintiff is justified in
expecting, if the plaintiff relies on the negligent misrepresentation
in a transaction. This rule does not speak in terms of contributory
negligence as a defense. The issue is not that plaintiff had a duty to
exercise reasonable care in making a determination whether to
rely on defendants’ negligent representation . . . . Justifiable reliance by plaintiff is the issue . . . .136

Neff held that the affirmative defense of contributory negligence did
not apply to the negligent misrepresentation claim.137 Neff emphasized
that the defendant was a fiduciary, which went towards the plaintiff’s justification in relying on the fiduciary’s representation. The court’s explanation in Neff indicated that the Restatement would not permit
contributory negligence to apply as an affirmative defense. Rather, the
court affirmed that justifiable reliance is a core issue in a negligent misrepresentation claim. As such, the tort could not be simultaneously analyzed in terms of the plaintiff’s justified reliance and negligence in
reliance because the two inquiries are essentially the same.
IV. THE MAJORITY RULE AND THE MINORITY RULE: DOES
COMPARATIVE FAULT PROVIDE A DEFENSE TO
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION?

C M
Y K
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135. Id. ¶ 17.
136. Id. ¶¶ 20–21 (emphasis added).
137. Id. ¶ 22.
138. See Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on Negligent Misrepresentation, 22 A.L.R. FED. 464 (1994)
(“Although many states have adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence, jurisdictions remain divided over whether it should apply to cases of negligent
misrepresentation.”).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
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There is currently a split among courts that permit a defendant in a
negligent misrepresentation claim to raise comparative fault as an affirmative defense and those that prohibit it.138 This section provides an overview of both the majority rule and the minority rule, emphasizing the
minority jurisdiction’s focus on the element of “justifiable reliance”139 in
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holding that the defense is ill-suited to apportion fault in a negligent misrepresentation cause of action.
A. Majority Rule: Comparative Fault Applies to Negligent
Misrepresentation

C M
Y K

R
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140. Larsen, supra note 138, at § 2(a).
141. 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986).
142. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 31.
143. Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 172.
144. Id. at 176.
145. Id. The court also agreed with the idea that there is no compelling reason to
treat negligent misrepresentation differently from any other form of negligence when
applying comparative fault. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 107, at
706 (4th ed. 1971)).
146. 696 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
147. Id. at 335.
148. Id. at 336.
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The majority of courts that have dealt with whether comparative
fault applies to negligent misrepresentation note that because the tort is
grounded in negligence, the standard rules governing comparative fault
“should apply.”140 Hicks cited a case from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Florenzano v. Olsen,141 to illustrate this principle.142 In Florenzano,
the defendant insurance agent misrepresented pertinent information regarding the plaintiff’s social security benefits, rendering her ineligible to
receive those benefits.143 The court held that the plaintiff had established
a claim for negligent misrepresentation, but that it would permit the defendant to compare the plaintiff’s own negligence in determining liability.
In so holding, the court explained that it could not discern any reason to
distinguish negligent misrepresentation from any other type of negligence, and that comparative negligence was a “long favored” way to apportion liability in tort claims.144 The court finally noted that it had
previously “applied [comparative fault] expansively, even extending it to
many causes of action not traditionally within the scope of negligence,”
and therefore it was logical to extend it to negligent misrepresentation as
well.145
Another majority rule decision Hicks cited was Gilchrist Timber Co.
v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.146 In Gilchrist, the supreme court of Florida held
that the doctrine of comparative fault statute applied to negligent misrepresentation.147 The defendant had sold a tract of land to the plaintiff and
supplied a false property appraisal. The appraisal stated the land was
zoned to permit residential usage, but it was actually zoned as preservation land that prohibited residential use.148 Gilchrist relied on the Restatement’s definition of negligent misrepresentation for guidance, explaining,
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“a misrepresenter is liable only if the recipient of the information justifiably relied on the erroneous information.”149
The court in Gilchrist reasoned that negligence is more tolerable
than fraud because the state of mind involved is less culpable.150 Accordingly, the same prohibition on comparative fault in fraudulent torts would
not apply to negligent torts, which is why the court found it appropriate
to extend the comparative fault statute to negligent misrepresentation.151
The court also explained that it did not foresee that a “parade of
horribles” would result from allowing comparative fault to apply to a
claim for negligent misrepresentation.152 It justified a tolerable burden on
future plaintiffs by reasoning that “a recipient of information will not
have to investigate every piece of information furnished; a recipient will
only be responsible for investigating information that a reasonable person
in the position of the recipient would be expected to investigate.”153
In sum, the majority rule holds that comparative negligence applies
to negligent misrepresentation claims as it would to any other negligence
tort. The majority rule courts that have adopted the Restatement have
not discussed the element of justified reliance and the tensions that arise
when subjecting the justified reliance element to a simultaneous consideration of the plaintiff’s negligence in relying.
B. Minority Rule: Comparative Fault Does Not Apply to Negligent
Misrepresentation

C M
Y K

Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Estate of Braswell v. People’s Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510 (R.I. 1992).
Id. at 515.
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150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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Estate of Braswell v. People’s Credit Union is the seminal case
adopting and explaining the minority rule.154 In that case, the plaintiffs
took out a loan from the defendant’s credit union and were told the loan
was insured when it actually was not. The plaintiff had taken out ten similar loans in the preceding decades from the defendant and each time the
defendant sent them a document entitled “Certificate of Insurance” and
told them the loans were insured. The court in Braswell looked to the
Restatement in determining the scope of the defendant’s liability for negligent misrepresentation, but the court rejected the proposition that the
Restatement contained a built-in affirmative defense of contributory
negligence.155
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156. Id. However, it is important to consider the counter-argument to the minority
rule’s rationale that experts should not be able to hide behind the plaintiff’s negligence when the expert’s negligence causes the damages: an expert in a given field is
more likely to know the truth, which would give the plaintiff a likely claim for fraud
against the expert, and comparative fault is an invalid defense to fraudulent misrepresentation. See Otero v. Jordan Rest. Enter., 1996-NMSC-047, ¶ 17 (rejecting comparative fault in fraud context and holding that a defendant “guilty of fraud cannot be
allowed by operation of law to profit by that fraud”).
157. Braswell, 602 A.2d at 513.
158. Id. at 515.
159. Id. at 513.
160. 98 Cal. App. 3d 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
161. Id. at 894.
162. Id. at 896.
163. Id. at 897.
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Braswell focused on policy concerns, reasoning that it would be improper to allow comparative fault principles to apply to negligent misrepresentation claims because defendants acting with expert knowledge (or
as fiduciaries) should be held to a higher responsibility in communicating
information that others might rely on.156 The court focused on the relative
expertise of each party and stated “[t]he imposition of a higher duty on
such defendants is apparently aimed at correcting disparate bargaining
power and protecting unknowledgeable or innocent consumers.”157 Braswell recognized the critical “need to protect consumers, to remedy disparate bargaining power, and to prevent unfair business practices”158 which
would be undermined by permitting the defendant to avoid full liability
with a comparative fault defense. The court also cited the related state
interest in “protect[ing] unknowledgeable or innocent consumers.”159
Another decision cited by Hicks that emphasized policy considerations in adopting the minority rule was Carroll v. Gava.160 In Carroll, the
plaintiffs purchased a mobile home park site from the defendants, and
the defendants misrepresented the site’s zoning requirements.161 On appeal, the defendants urged the court to apply a comparative fault analysis,
which the court rejected. Discussing the justification of the plaintiffs’ reliance, the court emphasized that the defendants were “in the mobile home
park business,” were experienced real estate sellers, and had previously
sold a similar site to another party.162 The court held that comparative
fault should not apply to claims for negligent misrepresentation because a
contrary rule would “create unnecessary confusion and complexity” and
reduce the “essential predictability . . . of everyday [business] exchanges
. . . .”163
Other minority decisions similarly focused on the Restatement’s element of “justified reliance” in holding that element is not subject to a
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comparative fault analysis. In McNeil v. Nofal,164 the Tennessee Court of
Appeals held it is illogical to apply comparative negligence when an element of the tort is the plaintiff’s justified reliance. Because the plaintiff
has to show she or he reasonably relied on the defendant’s representations to make a prima facie case, the element cannot later be tempered by
“a comparative fault analysis.”165 Citing the Restatement, the court
reasoned:
A successful claim for negligent misrepresentation requires justifiable reliance. To establish a prima facie case for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff . . . must show that he justifiably relied
upon a material misrepresentation made by an individual under a
duty to properly inform as to the material facts. Justifiable reliance in this context is not blind faith.166

The New Mexico Supreme Court has used unjustified reliance to
limit the plaintiff’s recovery in the past, holding that unless the plaintiff
makes some affirmative showing that his or her reliance on the defendant’s statement(s) was justified, there is no negligent misrepresentation
claim at all.167 Viewed this way, a plaintiff’s unreasonableness in relying
precludes recovery and disposes of meritless negligent misrepresentation
claims. The minority rule suggests that a plaintiff is either justified or was
not, and the task of apportioning fault does not need to come into the
analysis at all.168
Most courts following the minority rule similarly view “justifiable
reliance” as equivalent to a plaintiff’s lack of negligence. These cases
question the logic of holding that a plaintiff justifiably relied on a negligent misrepresentation but was also negligent for so relying.169 In other

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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164. 185 S.W.3d 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
165. Id. at 409.
166. Id. at 408 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
167. Ruiz v. Garcia, 1993-NMSC-009, ¶ 27.
168. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Baik, 55 P.3d 619, 627 (Wash. 2002) (“We see
no clear-cut way to distinguish between a plaintiff’s reasonableness in relying on a
misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s culpability in causing his or her own damages.”);
Honolulu Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Am. Ben. Plan Adm’rs, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1193 (D.Haw. 2006) (“[J]ustifiable reliance is an element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation; merging justifiable reliance and comparative negligence would eliminate the requirement of justifiable reliance altogether.”).
169. In re Brownsville Property Corp., Inc., No. 10–21959–TPA, 2013 WL 4010308
at *19 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. Aug. 1, 2013); see also Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford
Courant Co., 657 A.2d 212, 222 (Conn. 1995) (“Although we conclude that no special
relationship is required to state a claim of negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff
must allege and prove that the reliance on the misstatement was justified or
reasonable.”).
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words, because a plaintiff cannot make a claim at all if her reliance was
not justified, “unreasonable reliance already limits the plaintiff’s recovery.”170 In Condor Enterprises, Inc. v. Boise Cascade Corporation,171 the
court reasoned that the Restatement “equates justifiable reliance with a
lack of contributory negligence.”172 Condor held that under the Restatement, if the plaintiff is not justified in relying on a representation, he or
she recovers nothing because he or she cannot state a claim. Equating
justified reliance with a lack of contributory negligence means that merging justified reliance with comparative fault essentially eliminates the element altogether.173
The minority rule therefore emphasizes that those with superior
knowledge in a particular field should be held to a higher standard of care
than the less-knowledgeable party.174 In business exchanges where one
party usually possesses inferior expertise, the individual with superior
knowledge in the field in which the two parties are dealing should be
wholly responsible for misrepresentations causing economic harm.175
Moreover, the minority rule holds that the purpose of comparative fault,
which is to deal with the catastrophic consequences of physical injury,
does not apply to negligent misrepresentation claims where only commercial losses are sustained.176
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
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170. Larsen, supra note 138, at § 2(a).
171. 856 P.2d 713 (1993).
172. Condor at 715; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a.
(1977).
173. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Baik, 55 P.3d 619, 627 (Wash. 2002) (explaining the
problem with distinguishing “a plaintiff’s reasonableness in relying on a misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s culpability in causing his or her own damages”).
174. See Christine E. Carlstrom, Tort Law-Consumers’ Contributory Negligence
Will Not Bar or Reduce Recovery in Negligent Misrepresentation Actions, 27 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 576, 579–80 (1993).
175. See Estate of Braswell v. People’s Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 514 (R.I. 1992).
176. Carroll v. Gava, 98 Cal. App. 3d 892, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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The Hicks court’s reasoning is flawed in three ways. First, Hicks
failed to reconcile the conflict between requiring that a plaintiff prove
justifiable reliance and determining that the plaintiff was comparatively
negligent. Unlike the minority rule, which emphasizes the plaintiff’s justified reliance, the decision in Hicks gave it cursory attention. Second,
Hicks inadequately distinguished Neff, which stood for the proposition
that the defendant may not lay fault upon the plaintiff after the plaintiff
establishes justified reliance. Third, the court did not consider the public
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policy repercussions that the minority rule warns of. Had the court of
appeals more fully examined these issues, Hicks would have provided
more comprehensive guidance for future practitioners in harmonizing
comparative fault with the nature of a negligent misrepresentation claim.
A. Tension Between Justified Reliance and Apportioning Fault on the
Justified Plaintiff
In New Mexico, a plaintiff must establish justified reliance to proceed with a claim for negligent misrepresentation.177 But in Hicks, the
court did not consider the Restatement’s element of justified reliance at
all, nor did it examine the element’s diminished meaning under a comparative fault analysis. This cursory treatment of the Restatement is puzzling
because the opinion in Hicks affirms New Mexico’s adherence to the Restatement.178 A fuller analysis of justified reliance in light of a comparative fault defense would have helped clear up the confusion that results
from applying comparative negligence to a claim for negligent misrepresentation, namely because New Mexico law requires justifiable reliance
as an element of a prima facie claim, which already limits the ability of a
negligent plaintiff to recover. Furthermore, a brief discussion of New
Mexico’s Several Liability Act179 would have been helpful for future
courts and practitioners, because under the majority rule adopted in
Hicks, the Act now applies to negligent misrepresentation claims.
1. Justified Reliance as an Element of the Claim is Equated with No
Negligence by Plaintiff
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177. Ruiz v. Garcia, 1993-NMSC-009, ¶ 27 (holding that the plaintiff’s negligent
misrepresentation claim failed because she had not satisfied “the element of justifiable reliance as a matter of law”).
178. Hicks v. Eller, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 33.
179. NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987).
180. Since the adoption of comparative fault, New Mexico law favors holding all
parties, not just the defendant, responsible for their own respective acts to the degree
those acts have caused harm. Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 29. The underpinnings of this doctrine are based on fairness. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
181. See Ruiz v. Garcia, 1993-NMSC-009, ¶ 27. See also Larsen, supra note 138, at
§ 2(a) (“[W]here the plaintiff’s unjustifiable reliance does not allow the plaintiff to
make a prima facie case for negligent misrepresentation, unreasonable reliance would
already serve to limit the plaintiff’s recovery.”).
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While Hicks is in harmony with New Mexico negligence law in general that favors apportioning fault to the plaintiff when it is due,180 the
court neglected to carefully analyze why justified reliance could now be
considered in light of comparative fault when it had been more commonly viewed as a lack of negligence by the plaintiff.181 As New Mexico
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law requires, the plaintiff’s ability to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation in the first place depends on establishing justified reliance.182
When the plaintiff is negligent in relying on the defendant’s representation, the plaintiff fails to assert a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation and is barred at the threshold from recovering from the
defendant. By establishing that the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s
representations was justified, the plaintiff has shown that she or he was
not negligent in relying; indeed, that the reliance was reasonable.
Hicks made no effort to reconcile the potential inconsistency of requiring a plaintiff to justifiably rely on a defendant’s words while allowing
the defendant to offset practically all of its liability by showing that the
plaintiff negligently relied on defendant’s representations. In choosing
the majority rule, Hicks failed to deal with the confusion in the overlap
between justified reliance as an element of and comparative negligence as
a defense to negligent misrepresentation.183
2. Possible Solutions to the Tension Between Justified Reliance and
Comparative Fault
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182. Ruiz, 1993-NMSC-009, ¶ 27.
183. See McNeil v. Nofal, 185 S.W.3d 402, 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
184. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
185. See M.E. Occhialino, Bartlett Revisited: New Mexico Tort Law Twenty Years
After the Abolition of Joint and Several Liability–Part One, 33 N.M. L. REV. 1, 12
(2003) (“[T]he current requirement that plaintiff prove justifiable reliance as an element of a negligent misrepresentation case may be incompatible with comparative
negligence principles and perhaps should be transformed from an element of plaintiff’s case to the affirmative defense of comparative negligence.”).
186. ESCA Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 959 P.2d 651, 655 (Wash. 1998) (en
banc) (discussing tension between finding justifiable reliance on one hand, and comparative fault on the other;the court explained that comparative fault principles can
apply to other aspects of the plaintiff’s behavior that proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm, apart from the reliance element).
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To dissipate the confusion that results from considering a plaintiff’s
negligence when the plaintiff has already established justifiable reliance,184 Hicks could have explained that justifiable reliance should no
longer be considered a required element of the plaintiff’s claim, but
should instead be viewed only as the plaintiff’s general right to recover.185
Comparative negligence would then apply to determine “the proper
amount of recovery.”186 Understood this way, the doctrine of comparative
fault applies only after the plaintiff established his or her reasonableness
in relying on the defendant’s representations given the circumstances; it
would have no bearing on the plaintiff’s lack of negligence. Such reasoning would be compatible with New Mexico’s preference for comparative
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negligence.187 Furthermore, analyzing justified reliance in terms of the
plaintiff’s right to recover, instead of as an element equivalent to a plaintiff’s non-negligence, is harmonious with the UJI, which does not explicitly require justified reliance.188 Indeed, the UJI’s description of negligent
misrepresentation is arguably better suited to an application of comparative fault because it does not strictly require justified reliance as an element equal to non-negligence.189
Alternatively, New Mexico courts could permit the justified reliance
element to operate as a form of the old doctrine of contributory negligence, which would act as a total-bar defense to a plaintiff’s claim if the
defendant could establish that the plaintiff was not justified in relying on
the representation. This way, plaintiffs would not have to guess as to what
degree their own negligence could factor in to reducing a damage award.
Rather, plaintiffs would understand that if more damages were caused by
their own fault rather than the defendant’s representations, they would
recover nothing at all.
3. New Mexico’s Several Liability Act Now Applies to Negligent
Misrepresentation
Because the court in Hicks held that comparative negligence is a
valid defense to a negligent misrepresentation claim, it should have clarified its holding by explaining that New Mexico’s Several Liability Act190
now applies to the tort as an additional method of apportioning fault to

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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187. See Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 27.
188. Instead, the UJI simply requires that the defendant had “no reasonable
ground for believing that the statement made was true” and that the plaintiff did in
fact rely on it. UJI 13-1632 NMRA.
189. For example, the court in Staggs v. Sells, 86 S.W.3d 219, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001) explained that a plaintiff could have justifiably relied and “contributed to the
amount of damage suffered. Justifiable reliance is one of the elements that must be
established to the satisfaction of the trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence
before the tort of negligent misrepresentation can be established by a plaintiff. Such a
finding is not inconsistent with comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff.” Id. The
court in Hicks made no similar effort to clarify its interpretation of justified reliance
in this manner.
190. NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1(A) (1987). The Several Liability Act requires the jury
to account for all parties who contributed to the plaintiff’s injury in apportioning damages in any claim where comparative fault applies. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006NMCA-150, ¶ 20, 140 N.M. 728, 148 P.3d 814 (explaining “the general rule is that
each tortfeasor is severally responsible for its own percentage of comparative fault for
that injury”) (internal citations omitted); for a comprehensive overview and analysis
of New Mexico’s Several Liability Act and related cases, see Megan P. Duffy, Multiple Tortfeasors Defined by the Injury: Successive Tortfeasor Liability After Payne v.
Hall, 37 N.M. L. REV. 603 (2007).
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others. The Act allows a defendant to allocate fault to individuals other
than the plaintiff in any cause of action where comparative fault would
apply. Thus, under the rule established in Hicks, not only can the plaintiff’s negligence be considered, but also the negligence of additional parties that contributed to the plaintiff’s economic injury.191 If the Several
Liability Act now applies, carrying with it sweeping implications with regards to the additional parties now potentially liable for negligent misrepresentation, a brief discussion of the Act in Hicks would have been useful
for future litigants.
B. The Court of Appeals Inadequately Distinguished Neff
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191. Occhialino, supra note 185, at 11–12 (footnotes omitted). Professor Occhialino explained that if justified reliance were “transformed from an element of plaintiff’s case to the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. The Several Liability
Act and the doctrine of several liability would then apply to claims for negligent misrepresentation.” Id. at 12.
192. Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 1976-NMCA-029, ¶¶ 20–21.
193. See Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021.
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Related to its failure to analyze the “justified reliance” element of a
negligent misrepresentation claim, Hicks failed to fully distinguish Neff,
where the court of appeals focused exclusively on the plaintiff’s right to
rely on the defendant’s representations, not whether the plaintiff exercised due care in such reliance.192 By refusing to allow the defendant to
assert the plaintiff’s negligence as an affirmative defense, the court did
not consider the plaintiff’s negligence because he had already established
justified reliance. The thrust of the court’s argument in Neff was that the
defendant, acting in the scope of his expertise, failed to disclose known
facts to the plaintiff. Similarly in Hicks, the defendant was acting within
the scope of his profession and comparably failed to disclose facts he
should have known to the plaintiff. Neff emphasized that a negligent misrepresentation claim solely concerned the defendant’s negligence once
the plaintiff succeeded in establishing justified reliance. But in Hicks, the
court skipped the justified reliance analysis altogether. This is alarming
because at the time Hicks was decided, Neff meant that justified reliance
equaled a lack of contributory negligence. Hicks did not consider why
justified reliance would no longer be viewed this way.
Instead, Hicks quickly dismissed Neff without really considering its
rationale. While it is true that comparative negligence was not at issue in
Neff, this is because Neff was decided five years before New Mexico
adopted comparative fault.193 Hicks should have focused on the court’s
emphasis in Neff that negligent misrepresentation “does not speak in
terms of contributory negligence as a defense” and that “[t]he issue is not
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that plaintiff had a duty to exercise reasonable care in making a determination whether to rely on defendants’ negligent representation.”194 Under
Neff, the justifiably reliant plaintiff’s own negligence cannot be used to
reduce the defendant’s liability. Hicks should have more carefully distinguished it’s holding in light of the Neff opinion, which explained that negligent misrepresentation afforded no such defense.195
By the time Hicks was decided, some courts had interpreted Neff as
standing for the proposition that someone owing an elevated duty, in that
case a fiduciary, should not be permitted to raise comparative fault to
defend against negligent misrepresentation. Braswell analyzed Neff similarly, explaining, “when the defendant is acting with expert knowledge or
pursuant to a fiduciary relationship,” placing “a higher duty on such defendants is apparently aimed at correcting disparate bargaining power
and protecting unknowledgeable or innocent consumers.”196 It is puzzling
that the court in Hicks cited to Braswell but did not distinguish that
court’s interpretation of Neff.197 Moreover, like Braswell, the court in Neff
seemed concerned with the policy consequences of permitting a fiduciary
to lay off fault on the plaintiff due to the fiduciary’s elevated duty of care.
C. The Court Failed to Address the Public Policy Implications of the
Majority Rule

C M
Y K

R

06/25/2014 11:26:56

194. Neff, 1976-NMCA-029, ¶ 20 (emphasis added).
195. Id. ¶¶ 21–22; see also Occhialino, supra note 185, at 11. Occhialino notes that
it might be appropriate to transform justified reliance from an element of a prima
facie case to an affirmative defense of comparative negligence, but prior to the decision in Hicks that was not the requirement in New Mexico; the requirement was that
justified reliance was an element of the cause of action. Id. at 11–12. In analyzing
Neff, Professor Occhialino explained, “[o]ne might expect that the comparative negligence defense would apply in an action for negligent misrepresentation, but New
Mexico law is to the contrary.” Id.
196. Estate of Braswell v. People’s Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 513 (R.I. 1992)
(emphasis added).
197. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 32.
198. Id. ¶ 29.
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Hicks did not address the worrisome public policy repercussions of
permitting comparative fault in the negligent misrepresentation context.
Despite citing to several minority rule cases that espoused those concerns, Hicks made no effort to show why they would not be problematic
in New Mexico. This perfunctory treatment of policy indicates a lesser
concern for protecting innocent consumers, fair bargaining, and reliability
in business exchanges. The court attempted to justify its decision not to
engage in a policy discussion by asserting that the plaintiff made no policy
arguments in favor of the minority rule.198 Contrary to the court’s conten-
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199. Appellant’s Brief-in-Chief at 25 (“The actions and attitude of Peter Eller in
his dealings with Mary Jane Hicks, are not actions that the courts of this state should
support or encourage. This court should adopt a policy that comparative fault has no
place in the context of ordinary business transactions . . . .”).
200. Braswell, 602 A.2d at 514–15.
201. See Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 32.
202. Appellant’s Brief-in-Chief at 25.
203. Reichert v. Atler, 1994-NMSC-056, ¶ 8.
204. Hicks, 2012-NMCA-061, ¶ 33 (citing Reichert, 1994-NMSC-056, ¶ 8).
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a
(2000).
206. Id. (explaining the “intellectual underpinning” of tort law is based on the notion that multiple torts exist because each one raises varying policy considerations).

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 86 Side B

tion, the plaintiff did urge the court of appeals to consider the worrisome
policy considerations emphasized by the minority rule,199 such as the need
to protect less knowledgeable consumers.200 Hicks chose not to explain
why similar needs were not important in New Mexico.201
In neglecting to analyze these principles, Hicks chose the majority
rule, which alleviates the defendant’s burden to use the utmost care in
making representations because the defendant can assert that the plaintiff
should have also investigated, even when the plaintiff does not have the
same level of expertise. Hicks might have imposed a restriction against
professionals or experts being permitted to raise comparative negligence,
as the minority rule opinions do. Such a limitation would protect evenbargaining power as well as innocent consumers and would only apply to
situations involving financial injury in the limited scope of business
transactions.202
Furthermore, in New Mexico comparative fault applies only unless
contrary to public policy.203 While Hicks cited this proposition,204 its policy
discussion ended there. In Hicks, there were compelling policy arguments
in favor of prohibiting comparative fault. But in failing to address them,
the court failed to recognize that allowing comparative fault in a negligent misrepresentation claim might be contrary to the interests New Mexico hopes to promote. Under Hicks, defendants like the art dealer in that
case are now arguably less responsible for their careless representations
because they can successfully apportion fault to others.
Lastly, permitting comparative fault in negligent misrepresentation
claims undermines the policy underpinnings of the tort itself. The reason
multiple types of tort claims exist in the first instance is because “various
torts raise different policy concerns.”205 The minority rule is therefore in
accordance with the notion that policy can justify a rule of law.206 Unlike
Hicks, the minority rule refuses to allow comparative negligence mostly
because of state concerns such as inadequate consumer protection and
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promoting unfair bargaining. These concerns are important enough to
merit more consideration than Hicks gave them. In simply finding the
majority rule more persuasive, Hicks missed an opportunity to address
the strong repercussions in favor of the minority rule, which hinge upon
the nature of the tort itself as unlike other types of negligence. The reason the tort of negligent misrepresentation developed in the first place
was to remedy the narrow problem of negligently spoken words that resulted only in financial instead of physical injury.207 As the minority rule
emphasizes, and Hicks ignored, policy considerations should enter the
analysis when evaluating the propriety of comparative fault applying to
certain torts.208 Policy implications can render comparative fault inappropriate in certain causes of action.
Because Hicks declined to discuss these policy implications, future
litigants and courts dealing with comparative negligence in the negligent
misrepresentation context should take care to address them.209 Moreover,
future decisions will likely need to address just how much independent
investigation into representations made by experts and professionals will
now be required in New Mexico. After Hicks, it remains unclear exactly
when a consumer can safely rely on information given by an expert, and
when the consumer will face an obligation to investigate further.
VI. CONCLUSION
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207. See Maxey v. Quintana, 1972-NMCA-069, ¶ 16 (explaining the old view that
because negligent misrepresentation did not fall under fraud or deceit, “no other action was available and that the wrong of negligent misrepresentation was without a
remedy”).
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 1 cmt. d
(2000) (noting that “specific policies embodied in a particular cause of action” can
mean that applying comparative fault to the cause of action should be precluded).
209. “Courts should not merely rely on ease of administration, in the sense of judicial time and effort, to disregard important policy differences among different torts.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 1 reporter’s note
(2000).
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Hicks held that comparative
fault applies to negligent misrepresentation claims and refused to distinguish the tort from any other tort grounded in negligence. Hicks was
likely attempting to make New Mexico law on negligent misrepresentation congruent with negligence law in general by refusing to distinguish
negligent misrepresentation from other torts. However, Hicks failed to
comprehensively examine “justified reliance” and the element’s diminished meaning under a comparative fault analysis. Hicks provides a
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weak guide for applying comparative fault principles to negligent
misrepresentation.
Overall, the opinion in Hicks failed to reconcile the conclusion that
a plaintiff could negligently but justifiably rely on a representation. While
it seems difficult to harmonize a plaintiff’s justified—or reasonable—reliance on information with a simultaneous determination that the plaintiff
was also negligent, the court was unwilling to further analyze this tension.
Hicks did not provide a clear framework for reconciling justified reliance
as a requisite element of a negligent misrepresentation claim with a jury
finding that the plaintiff was also unreasonable in relying. The opinion
offers little guidance for future practitioners dealing with the tension in
applying comparative fault to a negligent misrepresentation claim. Under
Hicks, a negligent misrepresentation plaintiff can have justifiably relied
to the degree necessary to state a claim, but that justified reliance can
later be subject to an analysis of the plaintiff’s negligent reliance. After
Hicks, it remains unclear the degree to which a plaintiff can rely on a
professional or expert negligent representation without any risk of being
held comparatively responsible for the resulting economic harm.
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